

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED



SAPC-24230 ✓

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11 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: TALENT Control Officer

SUBJECT : Security Aspects of TALENT/AQUATONE

 REFERENCE : Memorandum for Project Director, from [redacted]
 [redacted] dated 10 February 1968, same subject,
 (SAPC-14327)

1. The referenced memorandum speaks for itself on the information that is made available with the TALENT briefing to individuals who have no particular need to know about AQUATONE. I am not particularly surprised or bothered about the first point [redacted] makes, that is, that CIA is identified as the Agency that produces TALENT material. I will say, however, that I see no reason why everybody that is briefed for TALENT has to have access to mission plots even though I realize [redacted] certain PPs do need this information.

2. Having in mind that the problem may be with us for sometime I would like to ask you to give serious attention to the manner in which such detailed knowledge of the dates and exact locations of AQUATONE and similar operations can be restricted within the group of persons who have a legitimate need to use TALENT photography. I know you have thought about this problem and I would like to ask for a written analysis of it with recommendations.

3. I offer the following views of my own for whatever value they will have as suggestions:

a. I well realize that Pib who are engaged in making mission plots and identifying precise locations, [redacted]

[redacted] must work with mission tracks. I am equally clearly convinced, however, that the majority of analysts who need to work with this raw intelligence, including, for instance, such groups as the engineers and scientists called in on guided missiles do not have to have mission tracks. It seems to me that the corner stone

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of a tighter security system must be a clear delineation of those who do and those who do not have a valid need to know about operational details.

b. If I am correct that such a delineation can be made, the only way it can be taken advantage of would be by having two levels of TALENT clearances. One of which would entitle the holder to access to operational information, the other only to the resulting raw intelligence. I would be as reluctant as anyone else to add another category of clearances but I suggest this would not be involved. My suggestion would be to give a full AQUATONE clearance to those analysts that have to know all about past operations, have it clearly understood that such an AQUATONE clearance includes a TALENT clearance and give only a TALENT clearance to those who do not need access to operational information.

c. If this is a sensible course to follow, it may be necessary to think about some changes in the titling of photography. I was rather shocked when I visited ATIC to find they are reconstructing mission plots from the coordinates given on individual frames of photography. As the users cannot be prevented from trying, out of curiosity, to reconstruct the operations then we better leave mission numbers, dates and times off the frames that go to non-AQUATONE cleared individuals.

27/Jan
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

RMB: ☐

1-Addressee

2-AQUATONE Security Officer *w/ cy ref*

3-Pro. Dir. Chrono

4-Pro. Dir. ~~FBI~~ *Intest Security Officer*

5-Pro. Dir of Ops

6-Pro. Chrono (RI)